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Don’t Call People ‘Rapists’:  
On the Social Contribution Injustice of Punishment1 
 
Kimberley Brownlee 
 
Abstract: We wrong a person as a social being when we deny him minimally 
adequate opportunities to contribute socially to other people’s survival and 
wellbeing. We can call this kind of wrong social contribution injustice. In the 
morally fraught domain of criminal justice, we perpetrate this injustice in 
many ways, including in our tendency to see people who have committed 
offences as social threats. One way that we exhibit this tendency in our use of 
classificatory terms such as ‘murderer’ and ‘rapist’ that essentialise people’s 
wrongdoing. We also engage in more concrete, material forms of social 
contribution injustice when we give people criminal records they can never 
spend, impose punishments that stretch or sever their social bonds, and deny 
them support when they are trying to reintegrate after punishment. We also do 
social contribution injustice to the dependents and affiliates of many of the 
people we punish. Much of this injustice is contingent on our practices, 
policies, and general attitudes toward offending.  
 
 
Keywords: social injustice, social rights, social contribution, social needs, 
punishment, crime, imprisonment,  
 
 
Introduction 
 
We wrong a person when we disregard or attack his social needs.2 First, we 
wrong him when we deny him minimally adequate access to decent social contact and 
inclusion.3 Second, we wrong him when we prevent him from cultivating and 
sustaining the social resources he needs to lead a socially integrated life. Third, we 
wrong him when we deny him minimally adequate opportunities to contribute socially 
to others’ survival and wellbeing. This paper addresses each of these wrongs while 
focusing specifically on the third wrong, which I call social contribution injustice. The 
paper examines the phenomenon of social contribution injustice within one morally 
fraught area of social and political life, which is the criminal justice system. 
The typical victims of social contribution injustice are people whom we deem 
to be socially useless, threatening, or deserving of censure. They include people who 
are vulnerable, dependent, young, old, newly settled, indigent, or otherwise 
disadvantaged. They include people who have severe physical or cognitive 
impairments. And, they include people who have been convicted of criminal offences. 
In other writing, I have fleshed out an account of social contribution injustice.4 
Here, I briefly summarise my account (Section 2) before applying it to the realm of 
                                                   
1 This article is forthcoming in Current Legal Problems. If possible, please cite the published version.  
2 Like most philosophers, I typically use ‘she’ as my gender-neutral pronoun of choice. In this paper, 
however, I use ‘he’ since the overwhelming majority of people who are suspected, arrested,  
charged, tried, convicted, punished, and incarcerated for criminal offences are male. 
3 Kimberley Brownlee, ‘A Human Right against Social Deprivation’, (2013) 63: 251 Philos Quart 199.  
4 Kimberley Brownlee, ‘The Lonely Heart Breaks: On the Right to be a Social Contributor’ (2016) XC 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 27.  
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criminal justice with the aim of exposing how our typical punishment practices do 
deep social wrongs, including social contribution injustices, to people who have 
committed offences. I focus first on the prejudicial attitudes that we have toward 
people who have committed offences. I highlight our tendency to use classificatory 
labels that reduce such persons’ lives to their offences, labels such as ‘offender’, 
‘criminal’, ‘murderer’, ‘rapist’, ‘thief’, ‘sex offender’, and so on (Section 3). Among 
other things, these status classifications make it hard for such people to see themselves 
as anything else, let alone as social contributors. I argue that we should not use such 
labels and should revise the attitudes that these labels reflect. I then outline various 
ways that we compromise such persons’ social resources, most notably within prison 
(Section 4). Along the way, I consider briefly which social rights, if any, people 
temporarily or permanently forfeit when they commit a criminal offence (Section 5). 
Finally, I answer two objections, which are 1) that the corrective justice system is the 
place in which people who have offended make their social contributions; and 2) that 
some people genuinely are social threats, not contributors (Section 6).  
Cashing out some of the wrongs we perpetuate in our criminal justice practices 
in terms of social contribution injustice exposes the ways that we dehumanise people who 
have committed offences by failing to acknowledge that they continue to be deeply 
social beings despite sometimes egregious, anti-social behaviour. It exposes the large-
scale, dismissive ways that we continue to fail this group of vulnerable people, as we 
previously failed (and sometimes still do fail) people with disabilities, women, members 
of ethnic minorities, immigrants, children, people in poverty, and elderly people. 
More specifically, this paper highlights injustices that we perpetuate principally 
against men – as the segment of the population most likely to be subjected to lawful 
punishment – in undervaluing them as social contributors within families.  
 
 
Background 
 
Social Needs  
 In other writing, I have defended the following view of our fundamental social 
needs.5 Having the abilities, means, and opportunities to be socially integrated is a 
constitutive part of a minimally decent human life. First, when we are babies and 
young children, we need highly intense, individualised, intimate associations with a 
small set of caregivers not only to ensure our brute survival, security, and core 
development, but also to enable us to cultivate the social abilities necessary to 
participate fully in social connections when we mature.6 Next, in order to maintain 
human lives of minimal moral decency, we continue to need close personalised 
nurturing, modelling, and support from intimate associates as we grow to maturity, 
even though we are no longer utterly dependent on them for our survival and 
moment-to-moment wellbeing. Then, as we age, if we are lucky enough to live to an 
old age, we tend once more to need close care and contact. Indeed, sometimes we 
need total care in order to survive let alone sustain a social existence. These periods of 
                                                   
5 This section summarizes work developed in Brownlee (n 2); and Brownlee (n 3). I adopt here an 
interest theory of rights that stresses, among other things, the moral urgency of certain non-contingent, 
fundamental needs.  
6 I use the term ‘intimate association’ in a technical sense to pick out our typically associations with 
family and friends, and to distinguish those associations from ‘collective associations’ or ‘expressive 
associations’ such as teams, clubs, unions, and so on. For a defence of the close associative needs and 
rights of children, see S. Matthew Liao, The Right to be Loved. (OUP 2015); see also, Neil MacCormick, 
'Children's Rights: A Test Case for Theories of Rights' in Legal Right and Social Democracy (OUP 1984), 154.  
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dependency that bookend our lives are not brief. We are infants and juveniles for close 
to two decades, and we are now living increasingly long lives as we age.  
Between these bookends of dependency, many of us are competent adults, 
who view ourselves as generally self-sufficient and (at least partly) autonomous. But, of 
course, we need others’ support and care when we are ill, incapacitated, injured or 
otherwise not self-sufficient. We need others’ support and care when we face 
significant moments that render us temporarily dependent, such as giving birth, facing 
death, or grieving for the loss of a loved one. We need others’ support and care when 
we are recovering from a traumatic event. We also need others’ support when we are 
reintegrating after a life-redefining experience, which long-term incarceration 
certainly is. Finally, to different degrees and in different ways, we need other people to 
invest in our worthwhile projects, goals, and ambitions in order for those enterprises 
to be meaningful to us.7 At least sometimes, we need other people to witness our 
efforts, hopefully empathise when we suffer and, ideally, share in our joy if we 
succeed.  
Alongside these social access needs, we have deep inclinations, indeed needs, 
to contribute socially to others’ survival and wellbeing. These contribution needs are 
rooted partly in our need to be secure within our social group; contributing socially is 
one way that we can seek to cement our place within a group. For this and other 
reasons, we want to be able to reach out to other people for connection. We want 
other people to accept our bids for connection at least some of the time.8 We also 
want to be someone on whom others can and do depend (at least in certain contexts 
and for certain purposes). These needs to contribute socially vary from person to 
person, can grow and diminish, and can be suppressed or corrupted. But, it is 
noteworthy that people who are socially isolated and who describe themselves as 
deeply lonely tend to be struck by the fact that no one needs them.9  
 In order to lead socially integrated lives marked by reciprocal investment, care 
and concern, we need both specific social resources and recognition from other people 
that we have these resources. As I have argued elsewhere, the resources that we need 
to participate in the world of social connections are:  
 
1) social abilities to form and sustain social connections;  
 
2) social opportunities to meet other people, to meet them again, and to form 
connections with them over time, and  
 
                                                   
7 John Rawls notes that ‘…unless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is impossible for us 
to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile’. He adds that associative ties tend ‘to reduce the 
likelihood of failure and…provide support against the sense of self-doubt when mishaps occur’. John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971), 441. I thank Tom Parr for highlighting these 
quotations.  
8 See Kimberley Brownlee, ‘The Ethical Dilemmas of Sociability’ (2016) 28: 1, Utilitas, 54, for 
discussion of the negative consequences for us individually and collectively in each of us refusing to 
associate with a particular person. For interesting discussions outside philosophy, see, among other 
things, R. Baumeister et al, ‘The Need to Belong’, (1995) 117 Psychol Bull, 497; M. Seligman, Flourish 
(Random House 2011); D. Ornish, Love & Survival: The Scientific Basis for the Healing Power of Intimacy. 
(HarperCollins 1998); as well as the work of John Gottman at the Gottman Institute.  
9 See, for instance, Sue Bourne, The Age of Loneliness (2016). Documentary aired on BBC One on 7 
January 2016: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06vkhr5. Retrieved from BBC iPlayer: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b06vkhr5/sign/the-age-of-loneliness. 
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3) actual social connections, which are valuable in themselves, but also can help us 
to form additional connections.10  
 
We need society, the law, and individual people to recognise, first, that we can have 
and (hopefully) do have these social resources which are necessary to lead a socially 
integrated life, second, that we are capable of contributing to social connections, and, 
third, that we actually make social contributions when we do.  
 We meet our deep social needs – to access and contribute to social connections 
– through a variety of interactions and associations that differ in their strength, 
intimacy, and persistence. They include day to day exchanges with strangers and 
acquaintances, ordinary decent membership within a political community, 
membership in expressive and collective associations such as team, clubs, religious 
communities, parties, and unions, closer ties with family members and friends and, 
hopefully, intimate associations that include loving bonds, interdependent care and 
intimacy.  
 In order to be able to form and sustain such connections, we also need to have 
a meaningful degree of control over the range and number of our social connections. 
In short, we need some degree of associative freedom, including a degree of 
dissociative freedom, which persons are denied in prison, as I discuss below. I have 
shown in other work that, although this freedom to associate (and dissociate) is 
fundamentally important, it is both less expansive than we tend to assume and 
secondary in importance to our core, positive associative claim-rights.11  
 
Social Injustice  
 In the context of interpersonal, social connections, social injustice does not 
pertain principally to debates about unfair and fair distributions of socio-economic 
resources amongst citizens.12 Instead, it pertains principally to violations of our 
fundamental rights to lead social lives in close proximity and relationship with other 
people. In relation to competent adults who are not experiencing a period of 
dependency, these rights can be framed largely, but not solely, in negative terms. 
Briefly, the familiar trinity of duties that governments and others have to respect, 
protect, and fulfil fundamental rights include, in this context, duties not to interfere 
with or deny people access to social opportunities to form connections, duties not to 
sever the social connections that people have already formed, duties not to allow 
third-parties to interfere with or sever those connections, and duties not to participate 
in practices that undermine people’s social resources. In positive terms, the duties 
include duties to ensure that people have meaningful opportunities for ambient and 
intimate social connection, and duties to attend to institutional design to ensure that 
facilities and services help rather than hinder people in their efforts to form and 
sustain connections.13  
Social injustice as a breach of these rights includes two sub-categories of 
injustice:   
 
                                                   
10 Brownlee (n 3), 28.  
11 See Kimberley Brownlee, ‘Freedom of Association: It’s Not What You Think’ (2015) 35: 2 Oxford J Legal 
Stud, 267; and Brownlee, (n 7).  
12 Of course, material resources intersect with social resources; and unfair distributions of material 
resources can exacerbate people’s difficulties in securing and sustaining social connections. I thank Jeff 
King and Tom Parr for pressing me to clarify this point.  
13 See Brownlee (n 7); Brownlee (n 10).  
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Social access injustice comprises the unjustified wrongs that deny a person access 
to the social resources he needs for safety, subsistence, and emotional stability, 
as well as the many things beyond that which make for a minimally decent 
human life.  
 
Social contribution injustice comprises the unjustified wrongs that deny a person 
minimally adequate scope, opportunities, and recognition to contribute to 
social connections according to his abilities.  
 
Social contribution injustice takes two forms:  
 
Compromising a Person’s Social Resources: This involves unjustly limiting a person 
in his development, maintenance, and use of those resources to make social 
contributions.  
 
Prejudice about a Person as a Social Contributor: This involves unjustly misvaluing a 
person as a social contributor, typically, by not taking him seriously as a social 
contributor either in general or in a context where he should be taken 
seriously.14  
 
The first form of social contribution injustice is largely behavioural. The second is 
largely attitudinal. But, the two are closely related.  
The paradigm cases of social injustice are child neglect and child abuse. These 
are the deepest social wrongs we can do to a person, since they occur during the 
formative years of juvenile dependency. When we severely mistreat a child, we rob 
him not only of the social support, care, and investment he needs as a child, but also 
of the developmental conditions he needs to cultivate the skills to lead a healthy 
socially integrated life as an adult. Sometimes, a person can transcend a horrible 
upbringing, but often his life course is set by such an upbringing.15 The data on 
offending rates and incarceration rates confirm that people who have endured 
abusive, chaotic, deprived, or otherwise challenging childhoods are overrepresented 
among the prison population relative to the general population. Some statistics 
presented by UK Minister of Justice Michael Gove include the following:  
 
Three quarters of young [people who have offended] had an absent father, 
one third had an absent mother, two-fifths have been on the child protection 
register because they were at risk of abuse and neglect.16 
 
                                                   
14 Misvaluing can take either the form of illegitimately undervaluing someone or the form of 
illegitimately overvaluing that person, in the way, for example, that we continue to overvalue women as 
primary caregivers relative to men.  
15 As Michael Gove puts it, ‘…growing up in a home where love is absent or fleeting, violence is the 
norm and stability a dream is a poor preparation for adult life, for any life.’ Michael Gove, ‘The 
treasure in the heart of man - making prisons work’, Address to the Prisoners’ Learning Alliance, July 
2015. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-treasure-in-the-heart-of-man-
making-prisons-work.  
16 In the UK, there are 2 million lone parent households with dependent children, 90% of which have 
single mothers. In total, there are 27 million households in the UK, which means that, across the 
general population, 7% of children in households have an absent parent. (Data from 2015.) The Office 
for National Statistics. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/bulletins
/familiesandhouseholds/2015-11-05#lone-parents.  
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•   41% of prisoners observed domestic violence as a child.  
•   24% of prisoners were taken into care as children. That compares with just 
2% of the general population.  
•   42% of those leaving prison had been expelled from school when children 
compared to 2% of general population.  
•   47% have no school qualifications at all - not one single GCSE - this compares 
to 15% of the working age general population.  
•   Between 20 and 30% of prisoners have learning difficulties or disabilities and 
64% have used Class A drugs.17 [This compares with 15% of the general 
population who have used Class A drugs.]18 
 
I assume that similar, if not more striking, statistics are to be found other Anglo-
American criminal justice systems such as the United States.  
Our common-sense attitudes toward children also include prejudices about 
them as social beings. We tend to view children as socially needy rather than as 
socially contributing, even though, at the same time, we actively make use of their 
social contributions. Children tend to be the social glue that holds families together. In 
addition to making countless bids for connection, children often contribute by caring 
for younger siblings, orchestrating household social events such as meals, and being 
companions to aging or incapacitated family members. Indeed, sometimes, older 
children are the primary caregivers of both younger and older family members, an 
event that is more likely to occur in families where one parent is absent, as in the case 
where a parent is incarcerated.  
Other examples of social injustice come in our knowing, if not wilful, neglect 
of many elderly people who require some support to sustain a socially integrated life. 
In allowing people to be neglected, we make a judgement as a community that their 
social resources are not sufficiently valuable to be worth accessing. We do a more 
specific form of social contribution injustice to elderly people and others who require 
home health care when we provide these services through many different care 
professionals. In doing this, we force these recipients of physical care repeatedly to 
start over socially, with the result that both care givers and care receivers are denied 
opportunities to be meaningful in each other’s lives by giving and receiving trust, 
being mutually invested witnesses to each other’s efforts, trials, and tribulations, and 
sharing in each other’s experiences over time.   
Another kind of social contribution injustice comes in judging certain people 
as socially valuable in general, but as not valuable in an important social sphere in 
which they are in fact social contributors. For instance, we continue to undervalue 
fathers as needed primary caregivers for their children, a prejudice that is exacerbated 
in the context of criminal justice (as I show below).  
 These examples highlight both the behavioural injustices and the attitudinal 
injustices that we tend to do to people whom we deem to be socially unimportant.19 In 
                                                   
17 Gove (n 13).  
18 Home Office, Drug Misuse Declared: Findings from the 2011 to 2012 Crime Survey for England and Wales 
(CSEW) (2nd ed 2012). Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drug-misuse-
declared-findings-from-the-2011-to-2012-crime-survey-for-england-and-wales-csew-second-
edition/drug-misuse-declared-findings-from-the-2011-to-2012-crime-survey-for-england-and-wales-
csew-second-edition.  
19 See Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (OUP 2007), for a discussion of related injustices including 
testimonial injustice, where the knowledge and understanding a person might contribute is unjustly 
discounted or devalued. 
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what follows, I expose the ways that we perpetrate these injustices – including, 
notably, social contribution injustice – against people who have committed criminal 
offences.  
Before proceeding, let me bracket one important issue, which is whether 
criminal justice and punishment are by nature practices that perpetuate social injustice 
in general and social contribution injustice in particular.20 I shall not answer this 
question. Instead, I shall focus on the particular kinds of punishments that we tend to 
use in Anglo-American systems, notably long-term incarceration, temporary 
segregation in isolation, long-term solitary confinement (used in the US, Australia, 
and Canada, for example),21 and indeed execution (in the US), as well as the kinds of 
attitudes that we tend to adopt in Anglo-American societies toward people who have 
been convicted of criminal wrongdoing.  
Let me start by reflecting on our attitudes – our prejudices – toward people 
who have committed offences since these attitudes feed into and off of the ways that 
we treat such people when we punish them. I will then identify specific ways that we 
compromise these people’s social resources, most vividly, but by no means exclusively, 
in our prisons. 
  
 
Prejudices toward People Who Have Committed Crimes 
 
The Language We Use 
In many domains, we have learned to be attentive to the language that we use 
to describe people, recognising that our language reflects, and fuels, specific 
perceptions of people. Thankfully, we no longer refer to people as ‘autistics’, or 
‘handicaps’, or ‘retards’. We no longer speak of ‘the disabled’, ‘the poor’ or the 
‘undeserving poor’. We no longer speak of married women as ‘a man’s better half’ or 
‘the Missus’. Instead, we speak of ‘people who have autism’, ‘people who are living in 
poverty’, and ‘married women’. If we’re sufficiently attentive to our language, we do 
not even refer to people with disabilities as ‘disabled people’, but as ‘people with 
disabilities’.  
Essentialist language is often disrespectful since it, first, reduces a person’s 
identity to a feature, trait, or act that ostensibly sums up the core of who he is and, 
second, often highlights a feature that historically (and sometimes still presently) 
carries a stigma. The first part brings the risk of inaccuracy and misunderstanding. 
The second part brings the whiff of prejudice. Both make it likely that we will act in 
                                                   
20 There is a substantial literature on equity, justice, and ‘social deprivation’ where the latter term refers 
to poverty, not interpersonal social deprivation. See, for instance, Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Equity and 
Mercy’ (1993) 22: 2 Philos Public Aff 83; Victor Tadros, ‘Poverty and Criminal Responsibility’ (2009) 43 
J. of Value Inquiry 391; Barbara Hudson, ‘Mitigation for Socially Deprived Offenders’ in Andrew 
Ashworth and Andrew von Hirsch (eds), Principled Sentencing (Hart 1998); Antony Duff, Punishment, 
Communication and Community. (OUP 2001), ch. 5.; Nicola Lacey, State Punishment. (Routledge 1994); J. Q. 
Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe. (OUP 2005); 
Antony Duff, ‘Punishment, Dignity, and Degradation’, (2005) 25: 1 Oxford J of Legal Stud, 141. 
21 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has mandated that the Canadian Minister of Justice 
implement a series of recommendations to ban the use of long-term solitary confinement in all federal 
prisons. See Sean Fine and Patrick White, ‘Trudeau calls for ban on long-term solitary confinement in 
federal prisons’, The Globe and Mail 13 November 2015. Retrieved from:  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/trudeau-calls-for-implementation-of-ashley-smith-
inquest-recommendations/article27256251/  
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ways consonant with inaccurate and prejudicial perceptions, that is, in ways that are 
patronising, demeaning, and potentially harmful.22  
Concerning inaccuracy, essentialist language can be innocuous or laudatory in 
itself: the terms ‘wife’ and ‘mother’ have positive connotations. But, even that 
language can be morally problematic when it hides salient information and, thereby, 
leads to both inaccurate descriptions and misunderstanding, such as in the case where 
the person to whom the terms ‘wife’ and ‘mother’ are applied is 11 years-old. In that 
case, those terms give an indefensibly misleading picture of who this person is and the 
circumstances in which she lives. 
Concerning prejudice, our tendency in the past to use essentialist language in 
domains such as disability is now viewed as evidence of ignorance and disrespect, and 
sometimes downright bigotry. It is notable, therefore, that, in contrast with our 
conscientious shift away from essentialist language in other domains, we continue to 
use it in criminal justice practice to refer to people who have committed offences. In 
ordinary speech, we label these people as ‘criminals’, ‘crooks’, ‘felons’, and ‘common 
criminals’. All of these terms are essentialist status classifications. It is true that the 
noun ‘criminal’, as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), has two distinct 
senses: (a) A person guilty or convicted of a crime; (b) A person with a tendency to 
commit crime. Only the second of these senses identifies a disposition to offend, but its 
essentialist connotations seep into all uses of the term ‘criminal’.  
Scholars and legislators who are more careful with their terminology use the 
less loaded, but nonetheless classificatory term ‘offender’, which is defined in the OED 
as: 1) A person who offends, who infringes a rule or regulation; a transgressor or 
sinner, as well as a person who gives offence, displeases, or causes resentment, upset, 
etc. and as 2) A person who breaks the law, one who commits an offence.  
In heartening rhetoric, Michael Gove lectured in July 2015 to the Prisoners’ 
Learning Alliance on ‘The treasure in the heart of man - making prisons work’, stating 
that:  
 
Our streets will not be safer, our children will not be properly protected and 
our future will not be more secure unless we change the way we treat offenders 
and offenders then change their lives for the better. There is a treasure, if only 
you can find it, in the heart of every man, said Churchill. It is in that spirit we 
will work.23  
 
Yet, unsurprisingly, as this quote confirms, Gove refers to people who have committed 
offences by the essentialist label of ‘offenders’.24   
In addition to these broad classificatory terms, we have a host of subtler 
generic taxonomies, which we apply to people who have committed particular types 
of offences. In ordinary speech, we refer to such people as ‘murderers’, ‘rapists’, 
‘thieves’, ‘psychopaths’, ‘serial killers’, and so on. Even reputable, language-conscious 
newspapers such as The New York Times and The Guardian have headlines such as ‘To 
Catch a Rapist’, ‘Rapist who came to UK with fake ID jailed for 'sadistic' sex attacks’, 
and ‘How not to Raise a Rapist’.  
Similarly, we refer to people who are suspected of committing a crime as 
‘suspects’ rather than as ‘people suspected of committing a crime’. This identifies the 
person with the suspected offence and puts some pressure on our commitment to the 
                                                   
22 I thank Adrian Blau for stressing this point.  
23 Gove (n 13).  
24 We do not tend to describe people who have committed regulatory offences as ‘offenders’.  
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presumption of innocence. (Indeed, historically, a person suspected of committing a 
crime was referred to as a ‘criminal’, i.e. ‘the criminal in the dock’.25) Thankfully, the 
term ‘suspect’ temporally constrained; the person who carries this label does not keep 
it for life. But, the person who is convicted of a criminal offence carries the official 
label ‘offender’, as well as all other unofficial labels, for a long time, sometimes for life.  
In a related vein, Nicola Lacey observes that we have a host of classificatory 
labels for people who are suspected or convicted of criminal wrongs that pertain to the 
particular social and political challenges that we are facing as a society today. We 
describe these people with such bad-apple terms as ‘terrorist’, ‘sex offender’, ‘irregular 
migrant’, ‘anti-social youth’, and ‘paedophile’.26 Sample New York Times and Guardian 
headlines on these themes include: ‘Sex Offender Village’, ‘Sex offenders gain right to 
appeal against registration’, and ‘Why giving polygraph tests to sex offenders is a 
terrible idea’. 
This appeal to character as probative or constitutive of guilt has been 
prominent at other times in history, Lacey notes, such as in the Victorian Era, where 
political and social anxieties led to the rise of various status classifications. The 
ostensible ‘bad apples’ then included the ‘fallen woman’, the ‘inebriate’, and the 
‘feeble-minded’. Lacey suggests that we tend as a society to resort to these kinds of 
short cut approaches to identifying criminal responsibility when our society is 
confronting particularly pressing perceived or genuine security risks.  
That may be true for our specific buffet of bad-apple labels, but our general 
selection of bad-apple labels remains on prominent display in our everyday language 
even when our society is not gripped by genuine or induced anxieties.  
Given our conscientious awakening to the importance of language in other 
domains such as disability, why do we still speak of people who have committed 
criminal offences in essentialist terms? In asking this question, I do not cast doubt on 
the seriousness of the acts that lead people to be convicted of crimes. Rather, I wonder 
whether we respond acceptably by describing such people in the terms just noted.  
One reason that we continue to use essentialist language in criminal justice 
might be that people convicted of offences are less politically empowered and hence 
less able to advocate that we collectively undergo a process of awareness-raising and 
self-re-education about the language we use to describe them.27  
A second, ostensible reason might be that, whereas the other socially salient 
groups noted above are not blameworthy or liable for the traits and experiences by 
which they came to be labelled, people who have committed crimes are responsible, 
blameworthy, and liable for their conduct and, hence, are not treated with prejudice 
when they are classified by that conduct.  
But, of course, moral blameworthiness, criminal responsibility, and criminal 
liability do not always coincide. In cases of strict liability, people are held to account 
even though they are not culpable and not thought to be culpable for the offence. 
Conversely, in cases where people are morally blameworthy for actions that do not 
properly fall within the scope of the law, such as infidelity, they are not held to 
account by the law and so not formally branded with the classificatory status of 
‘offender’.  
                                                   
25 See The Oxford English Dictionary (current online edition).  
26 Nicola Lacey, ‘The Resurgence of Character: Responsibility in the Context of Criminalisation’ in 
Antony Duff and Stuart Green (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011), ch 8.  
27 In many jurisdictions, people who are incarcerated are politically powerless; they are often denied the 
rights to vote, to work and to stand for office; they are segregated from society in a ‘repellent’ 
institution.  
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Also, even when moral blameworthiness and criminal liability do coincide, 
there is invariably more to each person’s story than the simple fact that he committed 
a criminal offence for which he is both morally blameworthy and criminally liable.28  
Moreover, some of the people who are members of the social groups 
mentioned above such as people with disabilities, are indeed responsible for the 
properties by which we no longer classify them. The reckless surfer who sustains a 
traumatic spinal injury while testing out rough waters, and the football star who 
becomes severely cognitively impaired after repeatedly continuing to play with a 
concussion, are responsible to some extent at least for having the disability by which 
we now recognise it would be derogatory to classify them.  
Changing the language that we use to describe people who have committed 
offences is only one step – but an important step – in overcoming our prejudices 
against such people. Other concrete steps we must take relate to the specific 
punishments we impose.   
Once a person commits a crime, it does become a feature of his life-story. But, 
how much should it define who he is? Some punishment practices, such as life 
imprisonment without parole and execution, imply that the act or acts in question 
define the person so completely that he is irredeemable, beyond the pale, incapable of 
change. This is a heavy, and I believe indefensible, judgment to make of any human 
being. Bracketing the fact that Avishai Margalit uses language that I am challenging, 
Margalit observes credibly on this point that:  
 
Even if there are noticeable differences among people in their ability to 
change, they are deserving of respect for the very possibility of changing. Even 
the worst criminals are worthy of basic human respect because of the 
possibility that they may radically reevaluate their past lives and, if they are 
given the opportunity, may live the rest of their lives in a worthy manner ... 
Even though it is likely that she will continue living this way, this likelihood 
should not be turned into a presumption, because in principle an evildoer has 
the capacity to change and repent. This capacity implies that she deserves 
basic respect as a human being who should not be ‘given up on’, precisely 
because there is a chance, no matter how small, that she will repent.29 
 
In more modest ways, other punishments also convey the view that a person who has 
committed a (certain kind of) offence is irredeemable or, at least, forever under 
suspicion. In some jurisdictions, if a person is given a prison sentence of four or more 
years, he then has a criminal record that he can never spend, but must always disclose 
on employment applications, volunteering applications, insurance papers, education 
courses, and immigration papers. In societies like ours that heavily stigmatise past 
                                                   
28 Psychology studies indicate that we are more lenient in our judgment of a person for his offence 
when we know the details of his story. See, for example, Mike Hough and Julian V. Roberts, 
'Sentencing trends in Britain: Public knowledge and public opinion', (1999) 1: 1 Punishment and Society 11; 
Julian V. Roberts et al (eds. Penal Populism and Public Opinion: Lessons from Five Countries (OUP 2003); and 
Sam Cuthbertson, 'Analytical Summary 2013: Analysis of complete “You be the Judge” website 
experiences' (2013), Ministry of Justice. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/203006/Analysis_o
f_complete_You_be_the_Judge_website_experiences__web_.pdf. I thank Andrew Neilson for 
highlighting this point.  
29 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 70-75. Cited in Tasioulas, 
John (2006), ‘Punishment and Repentance’ (1996) 81 Philosophy, 279. Cited also in Kimberley 
Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction (OUP 2012), 36.   
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offending, he might as well wear a scarlet letter A on his chest that casts him 
permanently in the role of a social threat and, consequently, all but denies him access 
to many areas of social life.30 Of course, this is a contingent consequence. If we viewed 
past criminal records with less aversion, the requirement to disclose one would not 
have such an isolating effect.  
A critic might still ask: Is it not morally acceptable that sometimes a person be 
judged, and classified, by a single act? In the opening paragraph of his novel How to be 
Good, Nick Hornby’s protagonist, Dr Katie Carr, reflects on this question as follows:  
 
…Even though I am, apparently, and to my immense surprise, the kind of 
person who tells her husband that she doesn’t want to be married to him 
anymore, I really didn’t think that I was the kind of person to say so in a car 
park, on a mobile phone. That particular self-assessment will now have to be 
revised, clearly. I can describe myself as the kind of person who doesn’t forget 
names, for example, because I have remembered names thousands of times 
and forgotten them only once or twice. But for the majority of people, 
marriage ending conversations happen only once, if at all. If you choose to 
conduct yours on a mobile phone in a Leeds car park, then you cannot really 
claim it is unrepresentative, in the same way that Lee Harvey Oswald couldn’t 
really claim that shooting presidents wasn’t like him at all. Sometimes we have 
to be judged by our one-offs.31  
 
While entertaining, the conclusion of the passage is debatable. First, we can only make 
sense of statements like ‘that act is wholly out of character’ if a given one-off action 
does not fit with the person’s previous behaviour, general disposition, tendencies, 
preferences, commitments, and values. If proposing to divorce her husband by mobile 
phone from a car park is out of keeping with Katie Carr’s character, then it’s 
irrelevant that moments in which to act this way haven’t arisen often in her life. Even 
in the case of a horrible crime (though not, perhaps, in the case of a premeditated, 
carefully orchestrated crime), the act also could be entirely out of keeping the person’s 
overall character.32   
 Of course, the problem is that much offending is not ‘out of character’ in the 
sense of being a one-off. Many people who commit criminal offences go on to 
reoffend. Indeed, consider the following statistics noted by Michael Gove:  
 
45% of adult prisoners re-offend within one year of release. For those 
prisoners serving shorter sentences - those of less than twelve months - the 
                                                   
30 For an analysis of the horrific impact on children’s lives when they are put on the sex-offender 
registry, see Sarah Stillman, ‘The List: When juveniles are found guilty of sexual misconduct, the sex-
offender registry can be a life sentence.’ The New Yorker, 14 March 2016: 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/when-kids-are-accused-of-sex-crimes. I thank 
Avia Pasternak for highlighting this article.  
31 Nick Hornby, How to be Good. (Viking 2001) 1. I thank John Gardner for directing me to this passage.   
32 A critic might argue that a horrible crime, even if it is unpremeditated, must have a partly 
constitutive impact on a person’s character. Put differently, we would be troubled by a person who 
dismissed his commission of a horrible crime as ‘out of character’. I thank an anonymous referee for 
highlighting this challenge. In reply, his viewing a horrible crime as out of character does not entail that 
he dismisses it. A person might well react to his crime with disbelief and horror, and the reason for his 
disbelief and horror is that the act is out of character. Until he did it, he had every reason to believe he 
would not act in such a way.  
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figure rises to 58%. And, saddest of all, more than two-thirds of offenders 
under the age of 18 re-offend within twelve months of release.33  
 
Recidivism might seem to suggest that the persons’ criminal conduct becomes part of 
a pattern of behaviour (that often increases in seriousness over time), and such a 
pattern is evidence of a certain disposition. In other words, the conduct might seem to 
reflect some solidifying of personality that tracks the person’s broader behavioural 
tendencies, attitudes, and beliefs.  
When a person displays what seems to be a disposition to offend, would it be 
prejudicial to apply an essentialist status classification to him that reflects that 
disposition? Would it be prejudicial to require him to declare that criminal record for 
the rest of his life?  
I expect that it is neither essential nor necessarily probably true of most people 
that they will commit crimes regardless of their upbringing, income, social conditions, 
education, or experiences. Conditions matter, as the above statistics on childhood 
mistreatment indicate. In other words, the people who tend to offend are those who 
tend to live in conditions in which many of us would be likely to offend if they were 
our conditions. (Related to this, statistics indicate that people tend to grow out of 
crime; the usual pattern criminal behaviour peaks in the person’s (or the man’s) early 
twenties, and then tends to tail off as they age.34) 
But, for a few people, it might indeed be probable (or inevitable) that they will 
offend regardless of their conditions. If they live long enough to grow into self-
directing agents, they will most likely engage in behaviour that our society has 
criminalised. (This idea invokes a stronger notion of essentialism than that deployed 
above: not only is the person deemed to be irredeemably an ‘offender’ in virtue of 
what he did (or will do), but he is deemed to be, by nature, an ‘offender’, i.e. someone 
who in all likelihood will engaging offending and re-offending regardless of his 
conditions.)  
Admittedly, some people do seem impervious to change, such as Leroy 
Hendricks who was convicted of 14 counts of child molestation, who reportedly 
declared he would molest children again if released, and who was eventually given a 
civil commitment on the ground of mental abnormality.35  
For these persons, if there be such persons, a life-long record and an 
essentialist label might not reflect a prejudicial judgement of their dispositions. But, 
the record and the label would still bring injustice with them for two reasons. First, 
crime-related labels tend to occlude all other identities that people might have such as 
‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘spouse’, ‘child’, ‘caregiver’, ‘teacher’, ‘nurse’, and so on. Second, if 
indeed people are unable to change because of mental illness, for example, then 
crime-related labels and records would be unjust, as they would imply a level of self-
control that those people do not have. For these reasons, we should not apply crime-
related essentialist labels or life-long records to people even if the labels do not 
inaccurately characterise their dispositions.  
                                                   
33 Gove (n 13).  
34 I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. For relevant references, see UK Ministry of 
Justice Report on Transforming Rehabilitation (2014). Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transforming-rehabilitation-a-summary-of-evidence-
on-reducing-reoffending.   
35 See Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) USSC 521 U.S. 346. I thank Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for highlighting 
this case.  
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 Furthermore, even if we were to do no injustice to the person himself by 
labelling him by his offences, there are other good reasons – some of which are justice-
related – not to do it. 
First, according to research cited in the UK Ministry of Justice Report 
Transforming Rehabilitation (2014), a person is more likely to desist from crime if he does 
not identify with being an ‘offender’ or ‘criminal’, where desistance is understood as the 
process by which a person who is engaged in a sustained pattern of offending gives up 
crime:  
 
People with criminal records who do not define themselves purely as 
‘offenders’ but see themselves as basically good people who made a mistake 
may find it easier to desist.36  
Through our essentialist approaches to crime and punishment, we may be setting up 
the very conditions for people to become ‘the kind of person who does x’.  
Second, as a society, we might benefit from dropping our essentialist 
approaches regardless of their impact on people’s conduct and attitudes toward their 
own offending, since we might then be less resentful, harsh, and hateful toward people 
who commit crimes. 
 Third, since we cannot engineer a system of labelling in criminal justice that is 
sufficiently accurate that it ensures that we only apply essentialist labels to people to 
whom we would thereby do no injustice, we should dispense with essentialist labels all 
together.37 
Fourth, relatedly, philosophers have long distinguished between making 
correct judgements and appropriately expressing those correct judgements.38 If we 
opted for non-essentialist approaches in criminal justice, we would engage not so 
much in a deception or noble lie as an optimistic, charitable, friendly, cautious, 
humble, and respectful gesture that leaves open genuine prospects for redemption, 
repair, and restoration, whereby a person may genuinely disown and disavow the 
conduct for which he was convicted. Much suffering is endured both by the people 
who commit crimes and by their families.39 We needn’t add to it by branding them 
(for life) with a reductive, stigmatised classificatory status. There is some evidence of 
progress in this regard in the recent shift in the United States away from describing 
people as ‘ex-offenders’ and ‘ex-cons’, to describing them as ‘returning citizens’.40  
 Two final points on essential language are worth making. First, undoubtedly, 
sometimes people who have been the subjects of derogatory essentialist terms can take 
charge of those terms and reconceive of them in ways that remove their stigmatising 
sting. The essentialist term queer is one such example. But, other terms, such as 
criminal, crook, offender, and sex offender are not co-optable in that way because, roughly, 
they track wrongdoing; these are not labels that a person usually can, or should wish 
to, co-opt and redefine so as to wear proudly. Second, related to this, when we 
publicly apply a stigmatising label to a person that he cannot reconceive or abandon, 
                                                   
36 UK Ministry of Justice (n 31).  
37 I thank Laura Valentini for highlighting this point.  
38 I thank John Gardner for highlighting this point.  
39 See, for example, William Bülow, ‘The Harms Beyond Imprisonment: Do We Have Special Moral 
Obligations Towards the Families and Children of Prisoners?’ (2014) 17 Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 775.  
40 Although this language is less loaded than that of ‘ex-con’, it nonetheless mis-describes people who 
have spent time in prison since they have not left the society; they remain very much under its control 
as institutionalised and utterly dependent persons. I thank Jeffrey Howard for noting this point.  
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we deny him the ability to shape how he is perceived, to define for himself, if not for 
others, who he is.   
 
The People We Incarcerate  
Before exploring the details of some of our punishment practices, notably our 
approaches to incarceration, let me make one further comment on our prejudicial 
attitudes toward people who offend, which is made vivid by prison population 
statistics. 
According to the Howard League for Penal Reform, as of Friday 22 January 
2016, 85,260 people are being held in prison or young offender institutions in 
England and Wales. Of that population, 81,443 are male and, 3,817 are female: 
women represent 4.5% of the prison population. The Howard League also states that 
‘The child custody population at the end of November 2015 was 991. This a decrease 
of 9 since the last month and a fall of 64 compared to the same point last year. There 
are 37 girls in custody.’41  
According to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics, by the end of 2014, there 
were over 1,500,000 people in federal prisons. Of that, 7% were women, i.e. 105,000. 
Given that Anglo-American prison sentences are often lengthy and highly 
repellent – prisons tend to repel outsiders – these prison statistics may expose a 
societal prejudice against men as social contributors. Specifically, the fact that we are 
willing to lock up people – mostly men – for extended periods in these repellent 
institutions regardless of the negative impact on them, their families, friends, and 
dependents may reflect a general, societal judgement about men, or certainly about 
men who have committed crimes, as social contributors. As noted at the outset, we 
continue to devalue men within family settings anyway, and consequently we tend to 
locate their recognised opportunities to contribute in public, political, and economic 
settings. When a man offends and thereby shows that he is not abiding by the norms 
of those public settings, he loses his footing to show that he is a meaningful social 
contributor in other spheres such as his family.42  
We exhibit a similar, indeed stronger prejudice toward young black men, who 
are overrepresented among the prison population, and who endure multiple, 
intersecting forms of discrimination and disadvantage. These include, first, the 
prejudicial judgement that young black men do not contribute as much as they should 
either within families or within the more public spheres in which men are viewed as 
key contributors and, second, the suspicion that young black men are actively socially 
threatening.  
Our prejudicial attitudes about the social contribution potential of people who 
have committed crimes come out in our concrete, behavioural forms of social 
contribution injustice. I shall turn to those now, focusing on incarceration, as it 
presents the most vivid examples of social contribution injustice.  
 
                                                   
41 Statistics provided by the Howard League for Penal Reform. Accessed at: 
http://www.howardleague.org/weekly-prison-watch/  
42 For a discussion of a related issue under the heading of ‘hormonal inequality’, see Philippe van Parijs, 
‘Four Puzzles on Gender Equality’ (2015) 3 Law, Ethics, and Philosophy (forthcoming). Parijs says: 
‘Consider the fact that young men are massively overrepresented among perpetrators of violent crimes 
(partly against women, but to a large extent against other men), and hence…also among prison 
inmates. Here again, the hormonal story is not implausible…Has an [historical] advantage not thereby 
be turned into a disadvantage? Can it not be said that men are handicapped relative to women because 
of their greater propensity to end up in jail as a result of acts they would not have committed had they 
been women?’ 
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Compromising People’s Social Resources 
 
In his speech, ‘The Treasure in the Heart of Man’, Michael Gove made an 
obvious observation that is nonetheless worth highlighting:  
 
While individuals are in custody the state is responsible for every aspect of 
their welfare. We can determine who prisoners see, how they eat, wash and 
sleep. We can decide how they spend their day, what influences they are 
exposed to, what expectations we will hold them to, what they can watch, read 
and hear, what behaviour is rewarded and what actions punished, who we 
expect them to admire and what we hope they will aspire to.43 
 
In short, people in prison are rendered utterly, or near utterly, dependent.  
The following is an indicative list of the kinds of social harms that we often do 
to people in prison, which compromise their social resources and deny them social 
contribution opportunities. In the next section, I consider which rights, including 
social rights, persons might forfeit through serious wrongdoing. For now, I shall 
stipulate that, since the things listed below are among the most serious injuries we can 
do to people as social beings, these are genuine social wrongs against incarcerated 
people, rather than goods to which these people have forfeited their rights claims.  
a) Juvenile Detention: Putting a child in any institutional setting, let alone a 
prison, robs him of needed social resources both in the present and in the future. 
Institutional settings deny children the close, personalised contact, nurturing, and care 
they require in order to develop well. In holding a child in custody, we as a society 
convey a prejudicial judgement about that child’s present and future social 
contribution potential.  
b) No Privacy: In many, ordinary prison settings in Anglo-American systems, 
people have little or no privacy. They have no control over their living space. 
Someone can walk into their cell at any moment. Moreover, they have little or no 
control over their living arrangements or their cellmates, who may be psychologically 
unwell. Also, they must perform all of their private functions in the presence of those 
cellmates. Although freedom of dissociation is lexically secondary to positive 
associative claim rights, it is nonetheless fundamentally important, and is disregarded 
in these kinds of forced living arrangements.  
c) Lack of Decent Social Opportunities: Ordinary prison conditions may give people 
social contribution opportunities, but such conditions often do not give them decent 
social contribution opportunities. In both segregating and overcrowded prisons, 
people may well be systematically denied conditions conducive to cultivating decent 
social connections marked by joint narratives, mutual investment, and trusting 
relations.  
d) Grieving: Segregating persons from their families can have numerous effects 
on their social connections. Among other things, it can complicate, if not 
compromises, the process of grieving. When a person is in prison, his family may not 
stay close to him to grieve together for the loss of a parent, spouse, child, or sibling. 
The person in prison may not be able to help or support his family. He cannot know 
whether he might have saved the person who died or eased their pain as they died; he 
cannot be present with the person when they die. Logistically, he may not be able to 
                                                   
43 Gove (n 13).  
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attend the funeral: permission to attend may be denied, especially if it requires an 
escort to make an overnight stay.  
e) Solitary Confinement and Execution: Solitary confinement conditions vary but, 
typically, they risk the erosion of a person’s basic abilities to lead a socially integrated 
life. They also convey a prejudicial judgment that the person is not, and possibly never 
again can be, a social contributor. Instead, he is a social threat or nonentity. The same 
prejudicial judgment is made categorically when a person is executed.  
Not all prisons are like those just described. Weekend prisons, prisons that 
allow for conjugal visits and family stays, prisons that have norms of etiquette that 
require officials to address people formally differ significantly from the kinds of 
institutions just described. In the settings just described, we positively deny people who 
have offended the space to honour whatever moral responsibilities they have to play 
their part in ensuring that certain others’ social needs are met; specifically, we prevent 
them from discharging duties they have to care for dependents and affiliates.44  
 
 
 
Which Rights are Forfeited in Prison? 
 
An important, perennial question is: which rights does a person legitimately 
forfeit when he engages in serious wrongdoing? If a person forfeits rights other than 
his freedom of movement, do those forfeited rights include his social rights even 
though this denies him meaningful ways to show that he’s interested in reintegrating, 
that he can assume responsibilities, and that he can be someone on whom others 
could depend? Is it legitimate to curtail a person’s social contribution opportunities, 
and his social resources in general, in prison? Is it legitimate to deny a person any 
meaningful control over his associations in prison? 
Some of these questions I have answered in other work where I have explained 
why our basic social rights, notably the right against social deprivation, cannot be 
denied to us as a legitimate form of punishment; in brief, they are both too 
fundamental and preconditions for the meaningful exercise of many other rights.45 
My claim here is that, even if a person who is sentenced to prison were to forfeit all of 
the rights outlined in the discussion above (which in my view he could not do), that 
would not settle the issue since those rights are not the only rights at stake when a 
person is incarcerated.  
First, we must consider the social impact of prison on indirect victims. Social 
contribution injustice wrongs not only its direct victim, but also the particular people – 
notably children and other dependents – and non-human animals who would 
otherwise benefit from that person’s use of his social resources as well as the wider 
community that would otherwise enjoy the ripple effects of a person’s and his 
associates’ social contributions to each other.46 
Second, we must consider the residual impact of prison on the person’s rights 
upon release, in a spirit akin to jus post bellum, which is the responsibility of victorious 
parties even when their ad bellum cause was just and their in bello behaviour legitimate.  
 Segregation both into prison and within prison threatens, stretches, and breaks 
social bonds. The longer that a person stays in prison the more likely it is that his 
social bonds will deteriorate or break, since his friends and family members (if he has 
                                                   
44 I thank Jeffrey Howard for highlighting this issue.   
45 Brownlee (n 3); Brownlee (n 2).  
46 Brownlee (n 3).  
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them) may die, move or abandon him. This is noteworthy not only in itself, but also 
for its impact on him when he is released, because lacking accommodation, 
employment, a non-criminal social group, and family are all factors correlated with 
re-offending.  
To take rehabilitation seriously, our society must invest in the post-prison 
transition. This means doing more than requiring that a person report regularly to the 
police or his parole officer. It means helping him to set up a new social network: 
helping him in those initial days and months to secure a home and a supportive, law-
abiding group.47 These provisions are vital to mitigate the damage done to his social 
connections during his time in prison.  
The severing of a person’s social bonds is salient not only for its effect on the 
person after release, but also for its effect on society as a whole. According to research 
cited in the report Transforming Rehabilitation (2014), numerous factors linked to 
desistance turn on having non-criminal social bonds.48 One such factor is having 
something to give to others:  
 
…[People who have offended] who find ways to contribute to society, their 
community or their families appear to be more successful at giving up crime. If 
these achievements are formally recognised, the effect may be even stronger. 
If correct, this point about recognition is particularly noteworthy. It signals that, when 
we fail to acknowledge that people who have spent time in prison can be and are 
social contributors, we not only do them an injustice, but can make desistance more 
difficult for them. Another set of factors associated with desistance are family and 
intimate relationships:  
There is evidence that forming strong and supportive intimate bonds with 
others appears to help desistance from crime, although more contemporary 
research is needed on this subject. Such relationships can reduce the amount 
of time spent in groups of same-age, same-sex friends (a known risk factor for 
young male offending). Strong partnerships and relationships with his or her 
children also provide an individual with something to lose if there is a return to 
prison. Living with non-offending parents can have the same sort of effect on 
ex-offenders who have returned to the family home. Finally, family and 
intimate attachments may give offenders a sense of purpose, meaning and 
direction. Individuals who devote themselves to raising their children or caring 
for elderly parents may find that crime and imprisonment are incompatible 
with such roles. 
A third set of factors is hope and motivation:  
 
                                                   
47 Concerning accommodation, a 2015 report from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
states that 31% of prisoners expect to be homeless upon release. (In the case of indigenous people, it is 
38%.) See Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘The Health of Australia’s Prisoners’ (2015). 
Retrieved from: http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129553682. In the 
UK, in 2012, two in five prisoners (37%) stated that they would need help to find a place to live after 
they were released. Of those, 84% reported needing a lot of help. See Kim Williams, Jennifer Poyser, 
and Kathryn Hopkins, ‘Accommodation, homelessness and reoffending of prisoners: Results from the 
Surveying Prisoner Crime Reduction (SPCR) survey’, (2012) Ministry of Justice. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278806/homelessn
ess-reoffending-prisoners.pdf. 
48 UK Ministry of Justice (n 31).  
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Research suggests that individuals who desist from crime are usually very 
motivated and confident that they can change their lives: offenders who clearly 
say they want to stop offending are the most likely to desist. The impact of 
these motivational factors has even been found in long-term studies up to ten 
years after release from prison. 
A fourth factor is having a place within a non-criminal social group:  
 
Those who feel connected to others in a (non-criminal) community are more 
likely to stay away from crime. Social networks that help desistance include 
extended family, mutual aid groups, clubs and cultural or religious groups.  
A fifth factor is being believed in:  
 
Research with desisters has identified that having someone believe in them is 
important and that desistance can be supported by interactions with others 
who communicate a belief that they can and will change, that they are good 
people, and that they have something to offer society or other people.49 
All of these factors reinforce the claim of this paper that we are deeply social, that we 
wish to make social contributions, and that we are better able to establish or re-
establish ourselves socially when we are given meaningful opportunities to contribute. 
Let me now address two possible objections to my account.  
 
 
Objections 
 
The Corrective System as a Place to Contribute   
One possible objection is that the correction system itself is the avenue through 
which a person who has committed a serious offence makes his social contributions, 
namely, by being open to re-education, by being responsive to societal expectations, 
and by genuinely seeking to repair, repent, and reintegrate socially.  
 In reply, first, this objection feeds into and off of our prejudice about people 
who have committed offences, namely, that they are ‘offenders’ first and last, that 
their other identities have been suspended or eliminated, that they must reform 
themselves first, and then, once reformed, might seek again to contribute socially 
through the various roles they once held, if they are able.  
Alternatives to long-term incarceration such as weekend prison, very short 
custodial sentences, non-custodial sentences such as fines, community service, and 
mandatory victim restitution, as well as non-punitive restorative justice, mediation, 
and healing rituals would allow people who have offended to retain some of their 
other social identifies, and not to be ‘offenders’ first and last until they have somehow 
reformed themselves.  
Second, if indeed we can view long-term incarceration as providing a person 
who has committed a crime with a forum through which to contribute socially, we can 
see it in this way only in a highly attenuated sense (at least in Anglo-American 
systems). Moreover, if we could legitimately see prison in this way, we could still not 
rest easy about the justness of our practices. It would only show that we do not 
                                                   
49 I shall bracket the problem of determining whether the supporter is sincere in their belief in the 
person who has offended. I thank Tom Parr for highlighting this problem.  
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compromise the person’s social resources (i.e. abilities, opportunities, connections). It 
would not show that we do not exhibit prejudice toward the person as a potential 
social contributor in other contexts and forums.    
 
Genuine Social Threats  
A second objection could be that our society is right to view at least some 
people who have committed crimes as social threats. The cause may well have to do 
with their being mistreated, but that does not alter the fact that they are permanently 
compromised in their social abilities and are regrettably genuinely ‘intolerable’. 
Related to this, we ask too much of victims when we propose to regard the people 
who have deeply wronged them as full persons who do not deserve to be reduced to 
their offences and have their social bonds severed through our modes of punishment. 
Allowing the man who has raped a woman to return to his parents’ home next door to 
her, allowing him to move freely and without social stigma, is too onerous for her, so 
the argument goes.  
In reply, I do not deny that there are costs in abandoning some of the ways 
that we respond to people who have committed offences. But, as I have argued 
elsewhere, we can grant that we should temporarily change the ways that we relate to 
a person who has committed offences, in order to reorient his attention to his 
wrongdoing, without granting that these changes necessarily or even permissibly 
include denying him minimally adequate access to decent social contact, inclusion, 
and contribution opportunity.50 The alternatives to long-term prison sentences noted 
above – such as weekend prison, short custodial sentences, non-custodial sentences, 
and non-punitive restorative justice measures – are all ways to signal that our relations 
with the person have temporarily changed, without denying him access to social 
connections.  
Moreover, although we cannot guarantee that a person will make good social 
contributions, particularly if the evidence is that he has a disposition not to do so, we 
still have good reasons to ensure that his social resources are not compromised so as to 
enable him meaningful opportunities both to try to contribute and to learn from others 
how to contribute.51 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Briefly, by way of conclusion, this paper has shown that we engage in a form 
of social contribution injustice in our tendency to represent people who have 
committed offences as social threats. This tendency is reflected in our continuing use 
of classificatory terms that essentialise people’s wrongdoing. In addition, we engage in 
a more concrete, visible form of social contribution injustice through many of our 
social arrangements within prisons, e.g. solitary confinement, lack of variety in 
contact, lack of decent contact, forced contact with the same one or two people not of 
one’s choosing, non-repeated contact, and severed contact. We do social contribution 
injustice to indirect victims, and we do social contribution injustice to people upon 
release from prison. Much of this injustice is contingent on our practices, policies, and 
general attitudes toward offending.  
 
 
                                                   
50 Brownlee (n 3).  
51 Brownlee (n 3).  
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